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present study explored choice behavior of healthy human participants in 
a variant of a probabilistic selection task (Frank, 2004). In this task, par-
ticipants learned through trial and error that abstract representations of 
novel food packages predicted visual feedback in the form of a human-
oid exclaiming either ‘yummy’, ‘okay’, or ‘yucky’, with varying probabil-
ities. As expected, the probability of correct choices increased across trials 
(p<0.0001) and did so more quickly for easy than for diffi cult stimulus pairs 
(p<0.001). Interestingly, the probability of correct choices given ‘yummy/
okay’ feedback was signifi cantly larger (p<0.05) than that for ‘okay/yucky’ 
feedback, even after controlling for the other infl uences. This effect was 
also evident in the test phase (which examines how learning generalizes 
across novel combinations of stimuli in the absence of feedback). This result 
suggests distinct disgust-driven and reward-driven learning mechanisms, 
engaged here by entirely abstract feedback in a hypothetical ‘food choice’ 
learning task. A fuller understanding of the neural basis of these mecha-
nisms will be important if feedback-learning models are to be applied to 
food choice in humans.
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DISSOCIATING THE NEURAL REPRESENTATION OF RISK CON-
STRUCTS IN A NOVEL GAMBLING TASK Rena  Fukunaga1, Joshua W. 
 Brown; 1Indiana University — Risk is a concept with multiple meanings that 
are often disputed when used to inform cognitive neuroscience studies of 
decision making. This study was designed to test competing hypotheses 
of how risk is represented in the brain based on different measures of risk. 
We aimed to dissociate between three types of risk constructs, specifi cally 
variance (Preuschoff et al., 2008), loss probability (Brown & Braver, 2005), 
and the magnitude of a loss (Brown & Braver, 2007). Participants chose 
between a series of hypothetical gambles that measured their preferences 
regarding decisions about money. For each given trial, a sure payoff option 
was presented against a gamble option. Five gamble options were created 
in order to independently manipulate the risk constructs while keeping 
the expected value constant across the conditions. Gambles were created 
to consist of three pairwise comparisons that partially controlled for each 
of the three risk constructs thus ensuring that any effects from a given pair-
wise comparison was not due to the controlled factor. Preliminary fi ndings 
showed a greater bilateral anterior cingulate, right inferior frontal gyrus, 
and left insula activity at the time of decision with increasing variance of 
the chosen gamble. In contrast, we found no signifi cant activation for either 
the loss probability or the magnitude of loss in brain regions known to be 
involved in representing risk. Our results suggest that the neural represen-
tation of risk refl ects the variance of the possible outcomes, thus highlight-
ing the importance of distinguishing between the different measures of risk 
in decision-making paradigms.
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FRAMING EFFECTS IN DECISION-MAKING: ORBITOFRONTAL 
DAMAGE DISRUPTS THE DECISION, BUT NOT THE FRAMING 
EFFECT Anna  Garr1, Lesley  Fellows1; 1Montreal Neurological Institute, McGill 
University — People often make markedly different choices depending on 
the context in which options are presented, even when the objective values 
of the options are identical, an irrational choice phenomenon termed the 
framing effect. For example, people tend to take more risks when the poten-
tial for a loss is emphasized, but choose the certain outcome more often 
when the same decision is framed in terms of potential gains. A recent 
fMRI study proposed that the framing effect is mediated by the amygdala, 
with the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) playing a regulatory role and so pro-
moting more rational choice. Here we asked whether OFC damage alters 
the framing effect, measured using several widely used tasks including 
the classic “Asian-Disease Problem”, a multi-trial risky decision paradigm 
with monetary losses and gains, and scenarios where attributes of decision 
options were framed in positive or negative terms. Thirteen patients with 
chronic focal damage affecting OFC were compared to 13 patients with 
frontal damage sparing OFC and 28 demographically-matched healthy 
participants. OFC damage did not systematically alter the magnitude of 
the framing effect in any of these tasks although patients with OFC damage 
were somewhat more likely to make aberrant choices in trials that required 
right and wrong answers. This argues that the framing effect is the result of 
simplifying heuristics--decision ‘short cuts’--that do not require OFC and 
highlights the likely existence of multiple decision mechanisms within the 
human brain.
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NEUROFUNCTIONAL DIFFERENCES RELATED TO THE IOWA 
GAMBLING TASK IN HEALTHY OLDER ADULTS Kameko  Halfmann1, 
Julie  Gudenkauf1, William  Hedgcock1, Antoine  Bechara2, Natalie L.  Denburg1; 
1University of Iowa, 2University of Southern California — The Iowa Gambling 
Task (IGT) is thought to model real-life decisions by factoring in reward, 
punishment, and uncertainty. Impairment on this task has been associated 
with circumscribed damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC). 
Further, we have demonstrated that two groups of functionally and cogni-
tively intact older adults show divergent behavioral performance (impaired 
versus unimpaired) on this task – a difference we hypothesize is attributable 
to disproportionate decline in the prefrontal cortex. To specifi cally test this 
hypothesis, sixteen IGT-impaired and sixteen IGT-unimpaired older adults 
performed an alternate version (K’) of the IGT while in a functional mag-
netic resonance imaging scanner. We predicted that IGT-impaired older 
adults would have neurofunctional defi cits in the prefrontal cortex relative 
to IGT-unimpaired older adults. In early blocks of the IGT, we observed 
greater activation among IGT-impaired older adults relative to IGT-unim-
paired older adults in ventromedial prefrontal regions. In later blocks of the 
IGT, we observed greater activation among IGT-unimpaired older adults 
relative to IGT-impaired older adults in ventral prefrontal regions. These 
results are consistent with our original hypothesis that there may be dis-
proportionate decline in the IGT-impaired older adults. On a broader scale, 
these results are consistent with the interpretation of a neural dissociation 
between decision-making under ambiguity (in the earlier blocks) and deci-
sion-making under risk (in the later blocks).
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TEMPORAL DYNAMICS OF NEURAL COMPUTATIONS FOR STIM-
ULUS VALUE AND EFFORT COST Alison  Harris1, Seung-Lark  Lim2, Anto-
nio  Rangel3; 1Claremont McKenna College, 2University of Missouri-Kansas City, 
3California Institute of Technology — We often make decisions not only based 
on an item’s value, but also the effort required to obtain it: e.g., using a 
vending machine versus walking to a café. Whereas good-based value is 
represented in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), recent data has 
implicated dorsomedial frontal cortex (dmFC) in integrating stimulus 
value with effort cost to derive net (combined) value. However, the tempo-
ral dynamics of net value computation remain unclear. Here we examined 
this question using event-related potentials (ERP) while hungry subjects 
decided whether to work at different levels of physical effort cost (low, 
medium, or high grip strength) for the opportunity to obtain food. Sub-
jects’ decisions generally incorporated both stimulus value and effort cost, 
as indicated by signifi cant logistic fi ts to their choice curves. Parametric 
ERP responses associated with net value were visible from 100-300 ms after 
stimulus onset, negatively correlated with effort cost, and from ~450-650 
ms, positively correlated with stimulus value. Distributed reconstruction 
of stimulus-locked responses revealed signifi cant sources in the vmPFC, 
but not dmFC. In contrast, response-locked signals were chiefl y localized 
to dmFC and superior parietal sources rather than vmPFC, and largely 
refl ected effort cost computations preceding response. Together, these 
data suggest that localization of net value integration to vmPFC and dmFC 
sources depends on whether the data is time-locked to the onset of stimu-
lus or response. In line with a transition from good-based to action-based 
valuation, computations of effort cost may play an increasing role in dmFC 
activity in the time directly leading up to choice.
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SEROTONIN TRANSPORTER GENOTYPE MODULATES IMPULSIVE 
CHOICE IN HUMANS Catherine  Hartley1, Jonathan  Kanen2, Morgan  McK-
enna1, B.J.  Casey1, Joseph  Kable3, Elizabeth  Phelps2, Charles  Glatt1; 1Weill 
Cornell Medical College, 2New York University, 3University of Pennsylvania — 
Many important real-world decisions involve weighing actions that yield 
immediate gratifi cation against those that only pay off over time. The infl u-
ence of time on the subjective value of a reward varies widely between 
individuals, yet the origins of such differences are not well understood. A 
recent theory that serotonin fosters patience during intertemporal choice 
suggests that genetically mediated differences in serotonergic function 
may modulate temporal discounting. Here, we test whether a functional 
serotonin transporter polyadenylation polymorphism (STPP/rs3813034) 
